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FOR A UNIFORM SUBORDINATE BIAS LIABILITY 
STANDARD 
Rachel Santoro* 
 INTRODUCTION 
Jane was an employee at a paper manufacturing plant for seven years.  
For the first six and a half years of her employment, Jane had always 
received satisfactory reviews from her plant supervisor John, although 
these reviews documented her occasional tardiness and one disciplinary 
action for a safety violation.  However, Jane’s performance was always 
rated satisfactory overall, and John did not consider the infractions grounds 
for termination. 
Dave replaced John as plant supervisor in a management overhaul at 
the plant six months ago.  Other company employees had overheard Dave 
making comments that working in a manufacturing plant is a “man’s job” 
and a plant is “no place for women” because they are not “strong enough or 
tough enough to get the job done right.”  Other plant workers described 
Dave as generally curt and abrupt with his female employees, while being 
easygoing and friendly when interacting with his male employees.  Jane 
has likened Dave’s management style to an “old boy’s club.”  During 
Jane’s annual evaluation one month ago, Dave evaluated Jane’s work 
performance as unsatisfactory in a majority of the evaluation criteria in 
which she had always received positive marks.  Jane took issue with this 
evaluation and expressed her objections to Dave during their review 
meeting.  Dave responded that he thought her petite size and strength made 
performing laborious tasks at the plant difficult, and suggested that she find 
work more appropriate for “workers like her.” 
The plant was recently faced with financial difficulties and had to 
downsize; as a result, it fired Jane.  A human resources manager located at 
the employer’s corporate headquarters in a different city made termination 
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decisions based upon an investigation that included a review of personnel 
files and supervisor recommendations.  Performance evaluations and 
supervisor recommendations were heavily weighed in termination 
decisions, but past disciplinary actions and other performance related 
factors were considered as well.  Although the human resources manager 
who terminated Jane never met her and did not harbor discriminatory 
animus towards women, at least part of the decision was based on Dave’s 
input.  Should the paper manufacturing plant be held liable for terminating 
Jane because of her immediate supervisor’s discriminatory animus towards 
women? 
The Supreme Court was scheduled to hear arguments on a similar 
issue in EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles1 in April 
2006.  The question was presented as:  “Under what circumstances is an 
employer liable under federal anti-discrimination laws based on a 
subordinate’s discriminatory animus, where the person(s) who actually 
made the adverse employment decision admittedly harbored no 
discriminatory motive toward the impacted employee.”2  Several circuit 
courts of appeals have adopted variations of the “cat’s paw”3 theory to 
answer similar questions and impute liability to the employer for a 
subordinate supervisor’s discriminatory treatment of a statutorily protected 
employee.  The “cat’s paw” theory imputes liability to an employer when a 
biased employee uses his or her employer as the formal mechanism through 
which to fire an employee for discriminatory reasons.4  It is also referred to 
as “subordinate bias” theory.  The circuit courts of appeals are split along 
three general levels of subordinate bias influence that is necessary to 
impute liability to the employer in cases where subordinate supervisor bias 
influences employment actions:  (1) “principally responsible”5; (2) “any 
influence”6; and (3) “causal connection.”7  Days before the Supreme Court 
was scheduled to hear arguments for BCI, the case was dismissed,8 and this 
 1. 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A. v. EEOC, 549 
U.S. 1105 (2007) (No. 06-341), 2006 WL 2582502. 
 3. Judge Posner first dubbed the subordinate bias theory of liability as the “cat’s paw” 
in Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990).  The doctrine derives its name 
from a fable titled “The Monkey and the Cat” by Jean LaFontaine.  In the story, a cunning 
monkey persuades a cat to pull chestnuts out of a hot fire for the two animals to eat.  While 
the cat pulls the chestnuts and burns his paws, the monkey eats all of the chestnuts himself 
and deserts the cat. 
 4. See Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(discussing the nature of a cat’s paw case). 
 5. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277, 291 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 6. Shager, 913 F.2d at 405. 
 7. BCI, 450 F.3d at 487-88. 
 8. The parties settled and requested a dismissal.  See BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of 
L.A. v. EEOC, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007) (dismissing writ of certiorari). 
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important split remains unaddressed.9 
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should resolve this 
important employment discrimination circuit split.  Part I of this Comment 
summarizes the various circuits’ subordinate bias liability approaches in 
detail and identifies why one consistent standard is necessary.  Part II 
contends that subordinate bias theory has support in federal anti-
discrimination statutory frameworks.  Part III explains why the Tenth 
Circuit’s “causal connection” is the closest to an appropriate standard and 
identifies areas for improvement if it were to become the uniform standard.  
Finally, Part IV addresses the need for a definitive approach to the 
“independent investigation” requirement articulated in all of the 
subordinate bias liability approaches. 
I. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Shager v. Upjohn Co. is the original “cat’s paw” case.  In an opinion 
written by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit held that “any influence” of a 
biased supervisor is enough to impute liability for discrimination to an 
employer.10  In Shager, a middle-aged fertilizer salesman alleged that he 
was terminated from his position because of his younger, age-biased 
supervisor.11  The employee claimed that his supervisor asked him how he 
felt about being supervised by a younger person, assigned him a more 
challenging sales territory, and treated him poorly compared to a younger 
salesman who held the same employment position.12  The Seventh Circuit 
reversed the summary judgment order to defendants, and extended the 
doctrine of respondeat superior13 to the employment discrimination 
context.  The court held that when a biased subordinate deliberately acts to 
create an unfavorable employment situation for an employee, the employer 
for which the biased subordinate is an agent should be held liable for 
 9. The Supreme Court had two more opportunities to review subordinate liability bias, 
but declined both.  See Sawicki v. Morgan State Univ., 170 Fed. App’x. 271 (4th Cir. 2006), 
cert. denied 127 S. Ct. 2095 (2007); Ray v. CSX Transp., Inc., 189 Fed. App’x 154 (4th Cir. 
2006), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1053. 
 10. Shager, 913 F.2d at 405. 
 11. Id. at 401. 
 12. Id. at 400. 
 13. The common law tort principle of respondent superior was adopted in the 
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.07 (2006) for employees acting within the scope of their 
employment.  See Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 807, 817 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(“[T]he plaintiff must show that the employee’s tort was in attempted (though often 
misguided) furtherance of the employer’s business . . . .”).  The Shager court noted that the 
common law rule is usually carried over to statutory torts because statutes often do not 
cover all the issues necessary to construct a complete tort liability regime.  Shager, 913 F.2d 
at 404. 
  
826 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:3 
ld 
liabl
 widely criticized and not 
followed by any other circuit court of appeals.22 
 
disparate treatment.14  Most circuits have adopted some variation of the 
“any influence” standard formulated by the Shager court, although the 
courts have differed over the level of influence the biased subordinate must 
exert over the employment action in order for the employer to be he
e.15 
In stark contrast to the broad “any influence” approach, the Fourth 
Circuit has held that a biased subordinate must be “principally responsible” 
for a termination based on disparate treatment of a protected employee in 
order to be held liable for employment discrimination.16  In Hill v. 
Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., a fifty-seven-year-old female employee 
alleged that she was terminated from her mechanic’s job at Lockheed 
Martin due to age and sex discrimination and in retaliation for her 
complaints about the alleged discrimination.17  The mechanic was 
terminated after a series of written reprimands for violations of quality and 
safety standards.18  Although she admitted that the reprimands were for 
valid violations, she contended that a safety inspector at her military jobsite 
reported two of these violations because he harbored discriminatory animus 
for her, evidenced by the inspector’s disparaging remarks about her age and 
gender.19  Because the two reports the inspector made resulted in the 
mechanic’s second and third reprimands, she alleged her termination was 
because of the inspector’s discrimination.20  The court declined to adopt the 
approach of the Seventh Circuit and affirmed summary judgment to 
Lockheed, declaring that even if the biased subordinate had played a 
significant role or had a substantial influence on the adverse employment 
action, it was not sufficient to hold the employer liable.21  The Fourth 
Circuit’s “principally responsible” test has been
 
 14. Shager, 913 F.2d at 404. 
 15. See Lancaster, 773 F.2d at 819-20; Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1182 (9th 
Cir. 2007); BCI, 450 F.3d at 487.  For a detailed discussion of the standards developed in 
, infra note 28, at 20. 
3d at 281-82. 
t 282. 
t 283. 
mindful [of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Hill] . . . .  That is not 
these cases, see Genova & Vernoia
 16. Hill, 354 F.
 17. Id. a
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. a
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 290-91. 
 22. See, e.g., BCI, 450 F.3d at 487 (“The Fourth Circuit’s strict approach makes too 
much of the phrase ‘actual decisionmaker’ . . . [and] also undermines the deterrent effect of 
subordinate bias claims, allowing employers to escape liability even when a subordinate’s 
discrimination is the sole cause of an adverse employment action, on the theory that the 
subordinate did not exercise complete control over the decisionmaker.”); Poland, 494 F.3d 
at 1182 (“No doubt an employer is liable for the discriminatory acts of a subordinate in 
cases where the biased subordinate is, as a practical matter, the actual decisionmaker.  But 
liability should not be limited to those cases only.”); Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 584 
(7th Cir. 2004) (“We are 
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Finally, the Tenth Circuit has adopted a “causal connection” standard 
that is positioned intermediately between the “any influence” and 
“principally responsible” standards previously discussed.  In BCI, a 
Hispanic District Sales Manager reported an African-American 
merchandiser to human resources for insubordination because the 
merchandiser failed to report to work after telling his supervisor that he 
would not make it in.23  The District Sales Manager had a history of 
making disparaging comments about African-American employees and 
treating them less fairly than other employees under similar 
circumstances.24  When the District Sales Manager reported the 
merchandiser to a human resources manager, she reviewed his personnel 
record and made the decision to terminate him.25  The human resources 
manager harbored no discriminatory views against the merchandiser—in 
fact, she didn’t even know he was African-American.26  The merchandiser 
filed suit against BCI after he was 
imination.27 
Adopting a middle-ground approach,28 the Tenth Circuit held in this 
case that a plaintiff must demonstrate a “causal connection” between his or 
her biased supervisor and the adverse employment action in order to prevail 
on the merits of a subordinate bias claim.29  The court further held that an 
employer could be held liable for the subordinate’s discriminatory bias if 
the plaintiff established that the biased supervisor’s report to the actual 
decision maker was the real reason for termination, that the other reasons 
given were pretextual, and that the employer did 
ciently independent investigation of the complaint.30 
The inconsistency of these three general approaches to subordinate 
bias liability has led to more questions than answers for employers.  
Depending on the jurisdiction in which these disputes are litigated, 
employers currently have varying levels of responsibility to ensure 
liability-free employment actions.  For instance, an employer under the 
Fourth Circuit’s standard could insulate itself from liability by having all 
adverse employment decisions performed by a committee, essentially 
creating a “revolving door” where the committee could terminate an 
the view of this court.”). 
 23. BCI, 450 F.3d at 480. 
 24. See id. at 482 (describing allegations of mistreatment lodged by Sales Manager at 
Hispanic employees). 
 25. Id. at 481-82. 
 26. Id. at 481. 
 27. Id. at 482. 
 28. Anjelo J. Genova & Francis J. Vernoia, Practical Considerations from Recent 
Development in Employment Law.  759 Prac. L. Inst./Litig. 9, 21 (2007). 
 29. BCI, 450 F.3d at 487. 
 30. Id. at 488. 
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employee for any discriminatory reason as long as the affected employee 
was questioned.31  In stark contrast, an employer defending against a 
lawsuit in the Seventh Circuit is faced with a difficult situation:  a single 
complaint or allegation by a biased supervisor could impute liability to the 
employer if an adverse employment action is taken in relation to the 
complaint, despite good faith policies and compliance with anti-
discrimination laws.32  Somewhere in the middle of these contrasting 
approaches, an employer under the Tenth Circuit’s standard may know that 
some type of independent investigation policy is necessary to protect 
against subordinate bias liability, but just who should investigate and how 
the investigation should proceed is unclear.33  These differing approaches 
not only leave employers uncertain about what type of procedural 
mechanisms to instate for adverse employment actions, but they also 
deprive affected employees of clear recourse for discriminat
THE CAT’S PAW THEORY OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY FURTHERS THE 
OBJECTIVES OF
Although the threshold of employer responsibility for discriminating 
employees with no actual decision-making authority varies among the 
different approaches, all agree that liability can be imputed to the employer.  
This agreement to impose liability on an employer for a biased 
subordinate’s act or influence is firmly grounded in
imination statutes and statutory principles of agency.34 
Adopting agency principles in the employment context furthers many 
purposes.  First, holding employers responsible for the actions of their 
 31. Tim Davis, Beyond the Cat’s Paw:  An Argument for Adopting a “Substantially 
Influences” Standard for Title VII and ADEA Liability, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 247, 257-58 
(2007). 
 32. See Dey v. Colt. Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir. 1994) (An 
employer may be liable if “an employee with discriminatory animus provided factual 
information or other input that may have affected the adverse employment action.”).  For a 
discussion of the many other circuits that have adopted lenient approaches, see Cat’s Paw 
Liability, 
http://www.uslaw.com/library/Law_Students/Circuit_Split_Cats_Paw_Liability.php?item=3
4000 (last visited March 25, 2009). 
 33. Genova & Vernoia, supra note 28, at 21. 
 34. Davis, supra note 31, at 249-51.  But see Brief for Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt. as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A. v. EEOC, 127 S. 
Ct. 852 (2007), 2007 WL 647974 (arguing that Title VII’s definition of an “agent” in 
subordinate supervisor cases includes only the formal decision maker, not the subordinate 
supervisor because an “agent” is only a party that has the authority to act on behalf of the 
employer). 
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biased employees in some cases, and recognizing that the decision-makers 
who are given official authority to take employment actions are not always 
the individuals who solely make the decisions, encourages employers to be 
more responsible when crafting policies and when hiring and overseeing 
subordinate supervisors.35  Additionally, it furthers the objectives of federal 
anti-discrimination statutes by ensuring that employees are afforded 
adequate remedies from employers that may attempt to shield themselves 
from liability by having all personnel decisions 
mittees or other removed decision-makers.36 
The Supreme Court has recognized subordinate bias liability based on 
agency principles.37  In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,38 the Court 
considered a case in which a female bank employee brought a sexual 
harassment suit against her supervisor and the bank.39  Although the Court 
declined to find employers automatically liable for any wrongdoing by 
supervisors,40 it did acknowledge that Congress intended for courts to look 
to agency principles when deciding whether to impute liability to
oyers for discriminatory or harassing supervisors.41  The Court stat
While such common-law principles may not be transferable in all 
their particulars to Title VII, Congress’ decision to define 
“employer” to include any “agent” of an employer . . . surely 
evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees
for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible.42 
The transfer of agency principles to employment discrimination was 
reinforced again in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth.43  The Court examined 
agency principles when deciding whether an employer was vicariously 
liable for a supervisor who sexually harassed an employee and made threats 
against the employee’s job security.44  Citing Section 219 of the 
 
 35. Mary-Kathryn Zachary, Subordinate Bias Liability:  Cat’s Paw, Rubber Stamp, and 
, 67(10), Oct. 1, 2006, at 22. 
agency principles are used to determine whether a person 
yer). 
7 (1986). 
OC that Congress wanted courts to look to 
a.”). 
mitted). 
2 (1998). 
Other Theories, SUPERVISION
 36. Id. at 23. 
 37. See Ali Razzaghi, Comment and Case Note, Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics 
Management, Inc.:  “Substantially Influencing” the Fourth Circuit to Change Its Standard 
for Imputing Employer Liability for the Biases of a Non-Decisionmaker, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1709, 1713 (2005) (explaining that 
or entity is an agent or emplo
 38. 477 U.S. 5
 39. Id. at 60. 
 40. Id. at 72. 
 41. See id.  (“[W]e do agree with the EE
agency principles for guidance in this are
 42. Id.  (internal citations o
 43. 524 U.S. 74
 44. Id. at 755. 
 45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) (“A master is subject to 
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be liable for both negligent and intentional torts committed by an employee 
within the scope of his or her employment.”46  Lower federal courts have 
applied this principle based on this Supreme Court precedent.47 
The cat’s paw theory of employer liability supports the objectives48  
The federal anti-discrimination statutes that are most intertwined in 
subordinate bias cases are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII),49 the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),50 and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).51  These statutes 
were enacted to combat discrimination in the workplace, protect employees 
most susceptible to discriminatory practices, and compensate employment 
discrimination victims.52 
The statutory language of these three statutes articulates these 
objectives very clearly.  Title VII states that it is unlawful for any employer 
to deprive an individual of employment based on “such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”53  Title VII’s goals are clear:  “[T]o 
eradicate employment discrimination and provide redress for victims of 
such discrimination.”54  Similarly, the ADA provides unambiguous 
language of intent:  No employer may discriminate “[A]gainst a qualified 
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in 
regard to . . . discharge of employees . . . .”55  Lastly, the ADEA also offers 
clear guidance on its objective:  to make it illegal for an employer to 
terminate an employee “because of such individual’s age.”56 
These statutes encourage employers to enact responsible policies that 
prevent and identify discrimination.57  However, the circuit split on 
subordinate bias liability thus far has only left employers with uncertainty 
as to how best to protect themselves against imputed liability for 
discriminatory non-decision-makers. Employers can only enact responsible 
policies if they are certain of the guidelines that apply to them, and of the 
“depth of the investigation required to defeat potential subordinate bias in 
liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their 
employment.”). 
 46. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756. 
 47. Razzaghi, supra note 37, at 1715-16. 
 48. Davis, supra note 31, at 249. 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq. (2000). 
 51. 20 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. (2000). 
 52. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (discussing the 
objective of federal anti-discrimination statutes). 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000). 
 54. Scott B. Goldberg, Comment, Discrimination By Managers and Supervisors:  
Recognized Agent Liability Under Title VII, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 571, 580 (1994). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). 
 56. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000). 
 57. Goldberg, supra note 54, at 577. 
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‘cat’s paw’ claims.”58 
III.  A “CAUSAL CONNECTION” STANDARD IS THE MOST BALANCED 
APPROACH TO THE SUBORDINATE BIAS IMPUTATION PROBLEM 
CONFRONTING EMPLOYERS 
A.  Benefits Of a “Causal Connection” Standard 
A “causal connection” standard that closely tracks the standard 
announced in the Tenth Circuit’s BCI ruling is the most appropriate 
approach because it conforms to the established anti-discrimination 
statutory framework and corresponds with the Supreme Court’s prior 
employment discrimination decisions.  Additionally, the “causal 
connection” standard serves the practical realities of the expanding modern 
workplace, where actual decision-makers are increasingly more likely to 
use combinations of their own business judgment and recommendations 
and evaluations from other subordinates to make employment decisions 
regarding employees whom they do not know well. 
Because the cat’s paw theory of liability is a commonly invoked 
theory in this sub-category of disparate treatment cases,59 a uniform 
standard should be aligned most closely with other disparate treatment 
standards.  In order to make a case for disparate treatment under Title VII, 
the ADEA or the ADA, an employee has to demonstrate that the adverse 
employment action was “because of” the plaintiff’s membership in a 
protected class.60  Legal scholars have long argued that the “because of” 
language requiring discriminatory intent should be accepted as a causal 
connection standard.61  These scholars point not only to the “because of” 
language articulated in the statutes, but also to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the language as applied to disparate treatment cases 
 58. Genova, supra note 28. 
 59. Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?:  
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision-Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 511 
(2001). 
 60. Title VII’s protected categories are “race, color, religion sex, or national origin.”  42 
U.S.C. § 2000-2(a)(1)(2000).  The ADEA protects a class of employees over the age of 40.  
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-624 (2000).  The ADA covers employees with disabilities.  42 U.S.C. §§ 
120101-12213 (2000). 
 61. See White & Krieger, supra note 59, at 503 (citing Paul A. Brest, Palmer v. 
Thompson:  An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Motivation, 1971 SUP. CT. 
REV. 95, 115-24); Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation:  The Interpretation of Action and the 
Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1991); 
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1247 (1995); Michael 
Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination  The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. 
L. J. 279, 288-291 (1997)). 
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brought under federal anti-discrimination statutes.62 
The causal connection standard is also favorable because it allows an 
employer to break the causal relationship between the biased subordinate 
and the adverse employment action if an “independent investigation of the 
facts” is conducted.63  This provision affords employers that adopt 
responsible policies and conduct thorough investigations much deserved 
protection.  It also acknowledges the practical realities that large employers 
face as human resources departments become more centralized.  A decision 
maker, such as a human resources representative, who works in a 
centralized department is unlikely to know an employee who may be at the 
center of an adverse employment action.  These decision-makers 
necessarily rely on evaluations provided by supervisors and complaints 
filed by co-workers.  Without this “independent investigation” provision, 
employers would be vulnerable to imputed liability because of 
organizational structures that often rely on subordinate recommendations 
and evaluations for crucial personnel decisions.  The “causal connection” 
approach, however, allows for an employer to escape liability if the 
employer conducts a reasonable, good faith independent investigation.64  In 
these circumstances, the standard would reward careful employers that 
implement procedural mechanisms to weed out discriminatory influence on 
employment actions, but would still protect employees’ rights by allowing 
causes of actions against irresponsible employers that do not take the 
necessary steps to break the causal chain in an investigation. 
If the “causal connection” test were to be adopted uniformly, it would 
also fairly address at least two otherwise tricky situations.  First, the causal 
connection standard would provide guidance when an allegation or 
complaint is made against an employee for discriminatory reasons, but 
 62. See White & Krieger, supra note 59, at 503 (“[T]he ‘because of’ test corresponds to 
the statutory language used in Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA [and] . . . the Supreme 
Court’s disparate treatment decisions, properly construed, would view the motive or intent 
inquiry . . . as a search for causation.”).  The authors discuss a series of opinions supporting 
the view that some degree of causation is necessary in disparate treatment cases.  E.g., Pers. 
Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . implies that the 
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 
‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”); 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (arguing that plaintiff 
must show that action was motivated by discriminatory conduct); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. 
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (concluding that the claim turns on whether the real reason 
for employer’s actions was racial discrimination); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 244-45 (1989) (discussing the balance of burdens once gender is shown to be a 
motivating factor). 
 63. BCI, 450 F.3d at 485 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 64. Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussing the impact of 
an independent investigation as compared to simply accepting the recommendations of 
supervisory employees). 
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upon the independent, nondiscriminatory investigation, legitimate 
misconduct is confirmed and the employer has valid grounds for an adverse 
employment action.65  Under this scenario, the causal connection test 
would not impose liability on the employer because the adverse 
employment action would be the result of actual misconduct discovered 
through an investigation by a decision maker without discrimina
Second, the causal connection standard is broad enough in scope to 
extend to situations in which the biased subordinate is any other employee, 
not just a supervisor, who may impact an employment action.66  
Broadening the standard announced in BCI to address this situation makes 
sense from a statutory perspective, as it is in line with the goal of 
eliminating disparate treatment for discriminatory reasons.67  It also makes 
sense from a practical perspective.  There should not be a difference 
between non-supervising employees and supervisors if both groups are able 
to lodge complaints, make false allegations, or otherwise unfairly 
undermine another party’s employment status because of a discriminatory 
motive.68  If adopted uniformly, a “causal connection” standard would 
allow room for the inclusion of a broad range of workplace actors and 
further anti-discrimination objectives.69 
B.  Areas for Improvement 
Several questions remain open regarding a “causal connection” 
standard for subordinate bias liability.  First, it is unclear what level of 
influence a subordinate must actually have to be said to “cause” an adverse 
employment action.70  In disparate treatment cases that turn on whether the 
 65. This situation is similar to the factual scenario in Kendrick v. Penske Transp. 
Services, Inc., 220 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2000).  In Kendrick, the court did not impute 
liability to the employer because the investigation unearthed a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason to terminate the employee, and the employee declined the decision maker’s request 
to give his version of events.  Id. at 1231-32 (concluding that the court must consider the 
facts as they appeared to the decision-maker at the time of deciding to take adverse 
employment action). 
 66. Ernest F. Lidge, III, The Male Employee Disciplined for Sexual Harassment as Sex 
Discrimination Plaintiff, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 717, 748 (2000) (detailing a scenario whereby 
the discriminatory animus of a supervisory employee would be attributed to the employer, 
even where another manager makes the decision to terminate). 
 67. See supra Part II (discussing liability imputed to the employer). 
 68. Lidge, supra note 66, at 749 (describing hypothetical situations whereby rank and 
file employees lodge complaints with a discriminatory animus). 
 69. The Tenth Circuit causation test does include imputed liability for employees on the 
same level of employment as the employee bringing suit.  See Young v. Dillon Companies, 
Inc., 468 F.3d 1243 (2006) (imputing liability to an employer for a worker who reported a 
co-worker on the same employment level to human resources with a discriminatory intent). 
 70. See White & Krieger, supra note 59, at 514 (describing the focus on causation in 
vertical decision making cases involving a subordinate and a higher level supervisor). 
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actual decision maker was motivated by discriminatory bias to take an 
adverse employment action, the employee alleging the discrimination must 
demonstrate that the decision maker is motivated to discriminate against 
the employee due to membership in a protected class.71  However, it is not 
clear under the cat’s paw theory that plaintiffs alleging employment 
discrimination must show the immediate supervisor or co-worker acted 
with conscious discriminatory animus.  Are subordinates and actual 
decision makers held to different standards for purposes of employment 
discrimination claims?  This remains unclear and should be resolved in 
favor of one standard for both groups to maintain a consistent approach to 
disparate treatment claims under a cat’s paw theory. 
Additionally, the question of whether liability can be imputed to an 
employer when a biased non-employee third party, such as an independent 
contractor or client, has undermined an employee’s status with 
discriminatory intent remains open.72  The causal connection standard (or 
any approach under the cat’s paw theory for that matter), has yet to be 
applied in a case where an employee is alleging that a non-employee 
caused an adverse employment action due to discriminatory animus.  
Because the cat’s paw doctrine is at least partly grounded in principles of 
agency and non-employees are not under the scope of federal anti-
discrimination laws, it would be difficult to impute liability to an employer, 
even if a discriminatory non-employee had substantial influence over the 
adverse employment action.73  However, this significantly narrows the 
protection afforded to employees by the cat’s paw theory.  In order for the 
causal connection standard to be consistent then, this tension needs to be 
resolved in favor of employee protection in circumstances where there is a 
causal connection between the biased individual’s discriminatory animus 
for a protected employee and an adverse employment action against the 
employee.74 
 71. Id. at 514-15 (discussing biases the court will consider in relation to negative 
employment decisions by supervisors). 
 72. See Davis, supra note 31, at 258.  The author identified this issue in relation to the 
Seventh Circuit’s broader “any influence” test because the circuit has only addressed a 
subordinate bias case in the context of a biased supervisor.  However, it is an open issue 
under the “causal connection” standard as well. 
 73. Id. at 258 (describing agency principles for purposes of imputing liability to the 
employer). 
 74. Id. at 259-63.  The author introduces a “substantial influence” standard and argues 
that under this approach, an employer may be held liable, consistent with agency principles, 
for an adverse employment action if a non-employee makes a discriminatory report that 
leads to action.  Id.  The argument is that any employee tasked with investigating complaints 
or accusations of wrongdoing by an employee is acting within the scope of employment, 
and therefore, such employees are obligated by their duty of “care, competence, and 
diligence” owed to the employer to investigate all allegations, regardless of source.  Id. 
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IV.  THE NEED FOR A DEFINITIVE APPROACH TO INDEPENDENT 
INVESTIGATION 
All three approaches articulated by the current circuit split do have 
one commonality:  the concept of independent investigation.  Whatever 
uniform approach is eventually adopted for subordinate bias liability, this 
“independent investigation” standard will need to be significantly 
developed.  Previous cases have suggested that it is an employer’s only 
way of breaking the causal connection between a subordinate’s 
discriminatory animus and the ultimate decision maker’s employment 
action.75  As such, it is imperative that employers know how far they are 
obligated to probe for an investigation to be considered sufficiently 
“independent” for purposes of avoiding liability. 
The current ambiguities surrounding what an independent 
investigation is create a burden for large and small employers alike, 
irrespective of their resources.  For instance, a large employer with 
significant resources at its disposal may have a large, centralized human 
resources department that handles all employment matters and takes 
adverse actions.76  In a large, centralized department, it is unlikely that the 
actual decision maker will know the employee involved in an adverse 
employment action.  An employer with this type of personnel department 
needs some guidance as to what it needs to do to ensure that a biased 
subordinate supervisor’s influence on an employment action does not fall 
through the cracks of an investigation.  In contrast, a smaller employer with 
fewer resources needs to know how much time and money must be put into 
an investigation.  While it may be less difficult to investigate a biased 
supervisor or alleged employee misconduct or violations in a smaller 
operation, resources may be more scarce, making outside counsel and/or 
internal manpower to complete a thorough investigation cost-prohibitive. 
Several circuits have discussed the concept of independent 
investigation,77 but the approaches of these circuits have not formulated a 
clear definition.  The varying statements describing what an independent 
investigation may look like only add to the confusion and uncertainty that 
surrounds subordinate bias liability as a whole.  Currently, it is unclear to 
employers how to best prepare and protect themselves through independent 
investigations from liability stemming from the actions of biased non-
 75. See, e.g., Shager, 913 F.2d at 406 (concluding that an independent decision by the 
employer’s career committee would have prevented a finding of a willful or innocent 
violation of the Act). 
 76. Id. at 405 (describing the role of the centralized career committee as the ultimate 
decision maker). 
 77. See supra Parts I, III (discussing outcomes in various circuits). 
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decision makers.78  A coherent framework needs to be constructed that 
defines the parameters of what type of investigation is sufficiently 
“independent” to absolve an employer of liability for a discriminatory 
subordinate. 
The courts that have adopted “any influence” and “causal connection” 
standards to impute subordinate bias to an employer have articulated some 
elements of the independent investigation requirement that should be 
included in a uniform formulation.  First, the Seventh Circuit announced 
some hallmarks of independence in Shager.79  The Shager Court stated that 
a thorough, independent investigation must amount to more than a mere 
“rubber stamp” on the biased subordinate supervisor’s recommendation or 
complaint;80 that is, the actual decision maker cannot accept the 
recommendations or allegations of a subordinate non-decision maker at 
face value. 
The Seventh Circuit, in Brewer v. Board of Trustees of University of 
Illinois,81 also noted that a decision maker cannot limit the investigation to 
only information received from an employee who may be biased, and must 
have some other procedural safeguards82 or unbiased documentation to 
support the independence of an investigation.83  An independent 
investigation is marked by “some affirmative act by the decision maker to 
come to his own decision.”84  In Brewer, an African-American student who 
worked at a university was fired from his parking services job because his 
supervisor failed to tell his boss that the student was given permission to 
park in a reserved parking space.85  The student alleged that his supervisor 
kept silent because of her racially discriminatory views towards him, which 
led to his termination.86  The court upheld summary judgment for the 
employer because the facts demonstrated that the decision maker conducted 
her own investigation to determine whether the student’s parking permit 
had been altered and if he had been parking illegally.87  “[W]here a 
decision maker is not wholly dependent on a single source of information, 
but instead conducts its own investigation into the facts relevant to the 
 78. Genova & Vernoia, supra note 28, at 25. 
 79. See 913 F.2d at 406 (describing failures of the employers decision committee). 
 80. Id. 
 81. 479 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 82. See also Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that a three-day hearing to investigate an allegation of employee misconduct was 
an independent investigation absolving the employer of liability for a biased subordinate). 
 83. See id. 
 84. Genova & Vernoia, supra note 28, at 25. 
 85. 479 F.3d at 909-10. 
 86. Id. at 909. 
 87. Id. at 919-21 (upholding summary judgment on claim since decision maker did not 
simply rely upon information supplied to her). 
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decision, the employer is not liable for an employee’s submission of 
misinformation to the decision maker.”88 
Other courts have offered suggestions regarding how much 
independent information has to be involved in an adverse employment 
action to break the causal link.  An investigation should not only rely on 
other sources besides a biased subordinate, but decision makers should also 
speak with the affected employees directly, try to ascertain their points of 
view, and assess the situation from as many perspectives as possible.  In 
BCI, the Tenth Circuit began to define independent investigation by stating 
that a review of a personnel file by the decision maker is not enough, as 
articulated by the other cases discussed above.89  Instead, the court went on 
to suggest that an independent investigation can amount to “hear[ing] both 
sides of the story before taking an adverse employment action against a 
member of a protected class,”90 and can be as cursory as “‘in the course of 
[the] investigation’ the decision maker asked the employee ‘to give his 
version of the exchange.’”91  The Ninth Circuit cited the BCI standard in 
Poland v. Chertoff,92 noting that for an independent investigation to be 
legally permissible and assist the employer in escaping liability, the biased 
subordinate cannot have influenced, affected, or been involved in the 
investigation in any way.93 
Similar to the principle of conducting a fair investigation by gathering 
as much independent evidence from the involved parties that was 
articulated in BCI, the Fifth Circuit held in Long v. Eastfield College,94 that 
an employer is liable for subordinate bias if the final decision maker bases 
his or her adverse employment action on the recommendation of the 
discriminatory supervisor, instead of conducting an investigation 
independently that considers all parties’ perspectives and finds additional 
evidence to confirm or refute the biased supervisor’s claims.95  In this case, 
two female employees sued a university for their terminations, alleging 
gender and national origin discrimination and retaliation.96  The president 
of the university made the decision to fire both employees, although he was 
not the party the employees claimed harbored discriminatory animus.97  
The court reversed the summary judgment grant on the unlawful retaliation 
 88. Id. at 918. 
 89. BCI, 450 F.3d at 492-93 (holding that examining personnel file without any 
additional action does not suffice as an independent investigation by the decision maker). 
 90. Id. at 488. 
 91. Id. at 485. 
 92. 494 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 93. Id. at 1183. 
 94. 88 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 95. Id. at 307. 
 96. Id. at 303-04. 
 97. Id. at 308. 
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claim, and discussed how different factual findings would determine the 
independence of the investigation taken.98  The president’s letters stating 
that his decision was based on the recommendation of the employees’ 
supervisors went in favor of “rubber stamping” the biased subordinates’ 
decisions, while the written statements requested from all parties to 
consider the different perspectives favored the finding of an independent 
investigation.99 
Speaking with the affected employee directly or examining statements 
made by the employee about the situation and in the process uncovering 
additional, independent evidence of a valid violation seems to be a strong 
indication that an investigation has considered the situation independent of 
any discriminatory bias.100  In Smith v. Chrysler Corp., an employee with 
narcolepsy alleged a discriminatory termination but did not prevail because 
the employee’s supervisor reasonably relied on documentation from the 
employee’s physicians and statements made by the employee himself that 
indicated he lied on his employment application.101  Even if a supervisor’s 
judgments are initially based on discriminatory views, the Sixth Circuit in 
this case suggested that independent evidence validating the claims is 
enough for the employer to escape liability.102 
A few cohesive characteristics stand out from these piecemeal 
descriptions of an investigation standard that may guide a future uniform 
standard and help employers develop investigation policies and avoid 
litigation:  (1) an investigation must be based on more than 
recommendations or allegations by subordinate supervisors; (2) an 
investigation must consist of more than reviewing a personnel file because 
of the risk that the contents may be tainted by subordinate supervisors; (3) 
an investigation must include asking affected parties for their versions of 
the story and documenting these statements; (4) an investigation must be 
conducted independent of a subordinate supervisor’s involvement; and (5) 
procedural safeguards must be in place to protect against an investigator 
becoming tainted, such as an investigation that obtains the perspectives of 
multiple parties and uncovers actual evidence of the affected employee’s 
wrongdoing.103 
There are some issues to consider under an investigation standard that 
bears the characteristics described above. First, who should conduct the 
investigation:  someone involved in the organization, or an outsider?  If an 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 307, n.8. 
 100. See Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 1998); Ware v. Unified Sch. 
Dist. No.492, 902 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 101. Smith, 155 F.3d at 807-09. 
 102. Id. at 808-09. 
 103. See discussion supra Part II. 
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investigation is conducted by an “insider,” such as a human resources 
representative or in-house legal counsel there are many considerations if 
that party is also the individual who fielded the initial evaluations, 
complaints, or other communications that triggered the adverse 
employment action.  For instance, one criticism of the BCI standard of 
independent investigation is that it does not take into account that the 
“factual misinformation”104 provided by a biased subordinate may taint the 
actual decision maker, even if this person was originally unbiased and 
approached the situation with independent judgment.105  This tendency is 
referred to as “expectancy confirmation bias.”106  This bias is often 
formulated when a recommendation has been made by another individual 
to the decision maker that functions as what the decision maker expects to 
find, even if conducting his or her own investigation.107  The vague 
investigatory standards that have been formulated by the circuits thus far 
have not accounted for these cognitive issues. 
This “cognitive phenomenon”108 also highlights other potential issues 
that arise when a company decision maker is making a personnel decision.  
A decision maker may consciously search for wrongdoing on the part of 
the affected employee by giving deference to the biased party’s superior 
position in the organization or the party’s relationship to the 
organization,109 investigating the claim in a way that focuses on uncovering 
other instances of employee conduct that confirm the original complaint,110 
and processing the information uncovered in a way that looks favorably on 
confirming evidence and unfavorably on contradicting evidence of the 
employee’s conduct.111 
A uniform investigation standard should account for these cognitive 
issues.  These biases that may permeate a decision maker’s investigation 
may be counteracted by also establishing mandatory procedures to check 
into the background, motives, behavior, and other circumstances 
surrounding the individual recommending the adverse employment 
action.112  Furthermore, investigations that involve interviewing neutral 
 104. Comment, Employment Law—Title VII—Tenth Circuit Clarifies Causation 
Standard for Subordinate Bias Claims, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1699, 1703 (2007). 
 105. Id. 
 106. White & Krieger, supra note 59 at 524. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Employment Law—Title VII—Tenth Circuit Clarifies Causation Standard for 
Subordinate Bias Claims supra note 104, at 1700.  The Comment suggests that 
psychological research supports a theory that decision makers will subconsciously recreate 
the findings of biased supervisors, ending in a decision that mirrors the discriminatory 
animus and undercuts any marks of independence. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1704. 
 111. Id. at 1704-05. 
 112. Id. at 1705-06. 
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employees not otherwise involved in the employment matter and looking 
into how similar employment matters have been handled by the employer 
previously would further preserve the independence of the investigation. 
The lack of objectivity risked by using an in-house party to undertake 
an investigation and make a decision is counterbalanced by the risks of 
using an outsider.  An independent consultant or external legal counsel may 
have more expertise in investigations, be more experienced in conducting 
interviewing employees and examining evidence, and be more likely to 
approach the investigation from an impartial perspective.113  However, 
outsiders may also be less familiar with the organizational structure of an 
employer, the parties involved in the employment matter, how similar 
situations had been handled previously, and the employer’s workplace 
culture.114  Additionally, the cost of hiring external parties to conduct 
investigations could be prohibitively expensive.115 
Therefore, who conducts a sufficiently “independent” investigation 
will depend on factors that include the severity of the allegation, the 
credibility issues of the employer and involved employees, cost, and ability 
to utilize objective parties in an investigation.116 
Additionally, the flexibility of a standard that adopts the described 
characteristics is a consideration.  A uniform investigation standard should 
be flexible enough to provide employers with discretion to make their own 
business decisions.  Actual decision makers, such as human resources 
personnel, are specially trained and experienced in making tough 
employment decisions.  An independent investigation standard should not 
be so stringent that it interferes with decision makers from tailoring 
investigations to particular circumstances, based on their experience and 
judgment.  Courts have long recognized that employers should have the 
authority to make their own decisions without excessive restrictions or 
judicial second-guessing.117  Therefore, in formulating a coherent 
independent investigation standard, the courts should be concerned with 
 113. John Montoya, Who Should Investigate Sexual Harassment Complaints?, 43 
HRMAGAZINE, Jan. 1998, at 113. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  The author also warns of the risk that employing counsel to both investigate an 
employment matter and provide legal advice may risk the waiver of attorney-client 
privilege.  See, e.g., Stoner v. New York Ballet Co., 90 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) No. 597 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2002) (permitting the plaintiff to depose the employer’s legal counsel in 
an employment discrimination matter because the attorney also conducted the investigation 
surrounding the employment action). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See, e.g., Stallings v. Hussman Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1052 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting 
that a court’s responsibility in ruling on disparate treatment matters is only to interfere if 
there is evidence of intentional discrimination, not to “sit as super-personnel departments 
reviewing the wisdom and fairness of the business judgments made by employers”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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balancing the prevention and remedying of employment discrimination 
with the employer’s interest in autonomous and discretionary decision-
making. 
 CONCLUSION 
The “cat’s paw theory” of subordinate bias liability has resulted in 
three inconsistent approaches to this subset of disparate treatment 
employment discrimination and created uncertainty for employers seeking 
to adhere to anti-discrimination legislation and protect themselves from 
liability.  The overarching goals of the federal anti-discrimination statutory 
frameworks—to encourage responsible employer policies118 and hold 
employers accountable for their actions119—can only be achieved if 
employers have an incentive for putting such policies in place.  Without a 
uniform standard that articulates employer responsibilities, some employers 
are vulnerable to liability exposure for virtually any biased subordinate’s 
actions that relate to adverse employment decisions, while other less 
responsible employers have unfettered protection from liability as long as 
they filter their adverse employment actions through centralized 
committees or human resources departments.  This uncertainty creates 
unreasonable and costly burdens for employees while simultaneously 
undermining employee protections and rights. 
When the Supreme Court granted the parties’ request to dismiss 
certiorari in BCI and later declined to hear two similar cases, it punted the 
question of what approach is appropriate back to the circuits.  Because this 
issue is vital to both employers and employees, the Supreme Court should 
accept a cat’s paw case and adopt a uniform approach that resolves the 
current Circuit split.  The “causal connection” standard adopted by the 
Tenth Circuit in BCI is the closest to a favorable approach because it 
furthers anti-discrimination objectives and strikes a balance between 
employer and employee interests.  The standard is stringent enough to 
protect employers because it does not allow for a “a lenient ‘may have 
affected’ standard that punishes employers for any ‘input’—no matter how 
minor—to weaken the deterrent effect of subordinate bias claims by 
imposing liability even where an employer has diligently conducted an 
independent investigation.”120  Such a standard will also allow courts to 
enforce anti-discrimination laws without sitting as super-personnel 
departments, second-guessing the personnel decisions of an employer,121 by 
still holding employers accountable for “rubber-stamping” subordinate 
 118. Subordinate Bias Liability, supra note 35, at 22. 
 119. BCI, 450 F.3d at 486. 
 120. Id. at 487. 
 121. Stallings, 447 F.3d at 1052. 
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decisions or for conducting investigations that are not sufficiently 
independent from a biased subordinate’s recommendations or allegations. 
Whatever uniform approach to subordinate bias liability is eventually 
formulated, the parameters of what constitutes an independent investigation 
must be defined.  Several circuits have discussed independent 
investigations; while none form a complete definition on their own, taken 
together, a clear and consistent standard can be formulated.  It is imperative 
that the Supreme Court hears a subordinate bias liability case to answer 
these unresolved questions. 
If the Supreme Court ultimately articulates a uniform test, it should 
balance an employer’s interest in making autonomous and reasonable 
personnel decisions without fear that every termination will be grounds for 
a suit, with an employee’s interest in protection against an employer who 
allows biased supervisors to affect a personnel decision without 
repercussions.  The judicial system should enforce and encourage 
responsible employer practices that underscore the objectives of federal 
anti-discrimination statutes.  It should also be wary of substituting its own 
judgment for that of the employers’, so that judicial overreaching and 
second-guessing do not undermine the deterrent effect of legislative 
enactments and otherwise undermine antidiscrimination goals. 
